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1 Ever  since  the  9/11  terrorist  attacks,  the  tropes  of  Islamist  extremism,  Islamic
terrorism or terrorist Islamism, and suicidal violence have become pervasive in public
discourses about global  politics  and Western governments’  rhetoric  of  the “War on
Terror.” This is partly due to the numerous terror attacks, mostly suicidal, by militant
Islamists around the world, with locations ranging from the U.S., France, England, and
Germany  to  Turkey,  Syria,  Iraq,  and  Afghanistan.  These  suicide  attacks  have  been
generating  worldwide  fear,  anger,  and  anxiety  towards  a  militant  Other  who  is
equipped with an extremist ideology and a readiness to use their own body as a weapon
to  destroy  the  enemy.  Yet,  the  equations  of  Islam  with  terror  and  Muslims  with
terrorists  show  the  post-9/11  Islamophobic  fruit  of  a  longstanding  Orientalist
representation of “the rest” by the West and for the West. Perhaps old but still worth
citing is Edward Said’s classic definition of Orientalism “as the corporate institution for
dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it,  authorizing
views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism
as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient”
(Said 3). 
2 Due  to  the  Western  media’s  strategy  of  what  Said  (1997)  terms  “covering  Islam,”
Western publics seldom learn about the U.S.’s own history of neo-colonial interventions
Islamophobia without Islamophobes: New Strategies of Representing Imperialist...
European journal of American studies, 15-3 | 2020
1
in the Greater Middle East  and its  cultivation of  Islamic extremism in Afghanistan,
implemented to contain and combat communism during the Cold War (Mamdani 119).
Instead,  media  representations  of  “terror  attacks”  accompanied  with  Orientalist
misrepresentations of Muslims and Islamicate cultures fortify Islamophobia around the
world to produce “a cultural-ideological outlook that seeks to explain ills of the (global)
social order by attributing them to Islam” (Semati 266). Consequently, Islamophobia is
a “master discourse” that “conflates histories,  politics,  societies and cultures of  the
Middle East into a single unified and negative conception of Islam” (Semati 267) “as the
civilizational foil of the west” (Beydoun 36). In American Islamophobia: Understanding the
Roots and Rise of Fear (2018), Khaled Beydoun explains how Islamophobia was “not only
endorsed and emboldened by law, but also carried out by government actors” (19).2
Therefore,  one  recurrent  outcome  of  this  outlook  is  that  Islamophobes,  either  as
private actors or policy makers in the West, presumptuously hold “Islamic faith and
cultures”  accountable  for  all  “terrorist  attacks,”  “suicide  terrorism” and any  other
forms of extremist activities against the West and Western citizens.
3 Two representations of the figure of the suicide terrorist will be analyzed here as they
are presented in the Showtime series Homeland (2011-) and the film Syriana (2005). This
analysis pursues two goals. On the one hand, through studying these two cases, I will
discuss  the  new  representational  mode  concerning  Arabs,  Muslims  and  Middle
Easterners in the American media in the post-9/11 era. In my analysis of Homeland and
Syriana, I will examine “the simplified complex representational strategies” (Alsultany
14)  that  Evelyn  Alsultany  introduces  in  Arabs  and  Muslims  in  the  Media:  Race  and
Representation after 9/11 (2012). In her book, Alsultany scrutinizes the unprecedented
“sympathetic portrayals of Arabs and Muslims” (4) in American media in the time of
“mourning, fear, trauma, anger, and presumably justifiable racism against the entire
Arab and Muslim population” subsequent to the September 11 terrorist attacks (1-2).
Building on her argument, my aim is to explain that even though the Islamicate world
and Muslims in the post-9/11 era have been portrayed more sympathetically,  these
media productions have had almost similar effects on the public to earlier Orientalist
productions. As Alsultany elucidates:
These  seemingly  positive  representations  of  Arabs  and Muslims  have  helped  to
form a new kind of racism, one that projects antiracism and multiculturalism on
the  surface  but  simultaneously  produces  the  logics  and  affects  necessary to
legitimize racist policies and practices. It is no longer the case that the Other is
explicitly  demonized  to  justify  war  or  injustice.  Now,  the  Other  is  portrayed
sympathetically in order to project the United States as an enlightened country
that has entered a postracial era. (Alsultany 16)
4 On the other hand, by discussing the figure of the suicide terrorist, I aim to counter the
equation  of  “suicide  terrorism”  and  Islam  based  on  the  logic  of  martyrdom as  an
exclusively Islamic way of destroying the enemy. Exploring the geopolitical context of
emergence of “suicide terrorism” demonstrates that terrorism in its various forms has
less to do with religious ideologies in general and with Islamic faith in particular and
more to do with responding to imperial politics in British colonies and postcolonies, as
well as U.S.-occupied territories in the Middle East, pre- and post-9/11. Nevertheless,
the Islamophobic equation of Muslim and terrorist in the Western media, preceded by
the  Orientalist  otherization  of  Arabs  or  Muslims,  has  been  an  important  part  of  a
process which Khaled Beydoun explains as “dialectical Islamophobia” (29). This process
binds the private Islamophobia of ordinary people with the structural Islamophobia of
Islamophobia without Islamophobes: New Strategies of Representing Imperialist...
European journal of American studies, 15-3 | 2020
2
the states such as in “War on Terror” policies enacted by Presidents George W. Bush,
Barack Obama, and Donald Trump (Beydoun 29). In dialectical Islamophobia,
structural Islamophobia shapes,  reshapes,  and endorses views or attitudes about
Islam and Muslim subjects inside and outside of America’s borders. State actions
legitimizes prevailing misconceptions, misrepresentations, and stereotypes of Islam
and communicates damaging ideas through state-sponsored policy, programming,
or  rhetoric,  which  in  turn  emboldens  private  violence  against  Muslim  (and
perceived Muslims). (Beydoun 40)
5 The  ultimate  outcome  of  dialectical  Islamophobia  is  legitimizing  and  valuing
imperialist necropolitics while delegitimizing its opponent, namely the necropolitics of
suicide  terrorism.  While  Achille  Mbembe  (2003)  defines  necropolitics  as  the  state’s
sovereign right to kill  its citizens, the American imperialist  necropolitics assumes a
neo-colonial transnational right to kill beyond U.S. national borders.
 
2. Necropolitics
6 In  defying  Islamophobia  and combating  neo-colonial  imperialist  necropolitics,  the
agency  of  the  colonized  and  the  dominated  is  a  critical  and  necessary  means.  By
assuming the power of self-representation, Muslims could raise their authorial voices
and present  an  authentic,  not  necessarily  Islamophilic,  image  of  Islam and Muslim
societies. This is the main characteristic of Post-Orientalism where “a critically self-
conscious colonial subject… attains agential autonomy by way of knowing the language
of  speaking  (fighting)  back  to  the  sovereign  [the  Empire]”  (xii),  as  Hamid  Dabashi
explains in Post-Orientalism: Knowledge and Power in Time of Terror (2009) in his efforts to
bring Said’s Orientalism up to date in the post-9/11 era. In the same vein, in Orientalism,
Terrorism, Indigenism: South Asian Readings in Postcolonialism, Pavan Malreddy contends
that Said’s argument needs to be complemented by including subaltern resistance to
colonial domination. Malreddy writes:
Said’s  overemphasis  on  ‘synchronic  essentialism,’  that  is,  the  distortion  of  the
Orient  in  literary  imagination  and  the  ensuing  attempts  by  the  colonizers  to
transform  the  Orient  in  tune  with  such  imagination  suffer  from  inadequate
attention to  the  resistance  (which  Said  has  later  termed ‘diachronic’ instability
(Said 2003 [1979]: 240) to the Orientalist discourse at large. (xxiii-xxiv)
7 Discussing the ways of resisting colonial rule and imperial powers in the colony and
postcolony requires a differentiation between the types of powers used by the rulers in
the colonies or postcolonies to dominate the occupied territories. In “Necropolitics”
(2003), Achille Mbembe expands the ideas of Giorgio Agamben and Michel Foucault to
explain the forms of subordination in the colonies. Mbembe argues that the notion of
biopower is insufficient to account for the subjugation of life to the power of death in
the colonies. He contends that the regime of biopolitical control in European societies
is replaced with necropolitical control in the colonies because “the sovereign right to
kill is not subject to any rule in the colonies. In the colonies, the sovereign might kill at
any  time  or  in  any  manner”  (Mbembe  78).  This  means  that  in  the  colonies,  the
sovereign’s right to ‘kill and let live’ or the threat of extralegal extrajudicial violence
and death define the relations of power. 
8 The  necropolitical  system  of domination  in  our  contemporary  world  creates  what
Mbembe calls “death-worlds,” i.e., “new and unique forms of social existence in which
vast populations are subjected to living conditions that confer upon them the status of
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the living dead” (Mbembe 92; emphasis in the original). Mbembe suggests that “today’s
form  of  necropower  blurs  the  lines  between  resistance  and  suicide,  sacrifice  and
redemption, martyrdom and freedom” (92). Stephen Morton explicates:
In the light of this argument, Mbembe’s claim that death is a form of agency for
people  who  live  under  colonial  occupation  helps  to  clarify  the  significance  of
violent,  anti-colonial  insurgency  as  an  assertion  of  political  sovereignty  in  the
context of a colonial regime that defines politics in terms of the right to injure,
torture and kill its subjects with impunity. (39)
9 From  this  perspective,  the  common  stereotype  of  the  Middle  Eastern  Muslim-born
terrorist  as  well  as  the  right  extremists’  equation  of  Islam  with  terrorism  can  be
countered. In this vein,  terrorism and suicide terrorism do not simply arise from a
special religious faith, particularly Islam, but are byproducts of colonial domination
and occupation of  the Muslim world.  To begin with,  an intersectional  study of  the
historical  roots  of  the  American  Orientalist  cultural  and  political  imaginary,  U.S.
imperialist geopolitics in the Middle East and the American neocolonial ‘war machine’
in Afghanistan could shed light on the complex history of the rise of Islamic extremism
and divert  from the prevalent  equation of  Islam and terrorism employed today.  In
“Good Muslim, Bad Muslim,” Mahmood Mamdani elucidates that during the Cold War
and “after the defeat in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal, at the start of Reagan’s
second term, the United States decided to harness, and even to cultivate, terrorism in
the  struggle  against  regimes  it  considered  pro-Soviet”  (Mamdani  769).  As  a  result,
Mamdani  explains,  “the  tradition  of  jihad—of  a  just  war  with  a  religious  sanction,
nonexistent in the last 400 years—[was] revived with U.S. help in the 1980s” (770). The
jihad against communism and the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan continued
after the Soviets retreated in 1989, thereby triggering a long civil war in Afghanistan.
This led to millions of casualties, the mass displacement of four million more Afghans
and  the  destruction  of  Afghanistan’s  infrastructures.  Later  on,  the  Taliban and  its
“suicide terrorism” emerged out of the agonies and despair of war against the Soviet
Union and the subsequent civil war, which had turned some regions of Afghanistan into
a death-world where people were being reduced to the state of living dead. Under these
circumstances, “suicide terrorism” might become the last chance of expressing agency
for somebody who is already in a state of living dead.
10 At this point, it needs to be iterated that this paper does not in any way aim to either
justify  “suicide  terrorism”  or  celebrate  terrorists  as  “freedom  fighters.”  Rather,  it
proposes  to  view  terrorism  in  light  of  anti-colonial  insurgencies  and  resistance  to
colonial occupation.
 
3. Representation of Suicide Terrorism
11 After a long history of Orientalist depictions of Muslims and Islam in Hollywood which
is  well  documented by Jack Shaheen’s  Reel  Bad  Arabs:  How Hollywood Vilifies  a  People
(2003),  in  recent  years,  Hollywood and Western Media  have begun to  offer  a  more
differentiated and sympathetic image of Arabs and Muslims. At first glance, the new
balanced portrayals  of  Arabs  and Muslims can be interpreted and appreciated as  a
decline in Islamophobic sentiments around the world (or at least among Hollywood
producers). The recent parliamentary elections in Europe and the latest presidential
election in the U.S., however, refute this optimistic turn. On the contrary, it seems that
a quiet  Islamophobia is  on the rise:  even though more people are avoiding making
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Islamophobic/xenophobic statements in public, the Islamophobic voters in Europe and
the U.S. are quietly voicing their opinions at the polls. Recent media productions and
Hollywood  films  are  just  mirroring  this  transformation  from  overt  to  covert
Islamophobia. Alsultany reminds us that as the U.S. government’s overt propaganda of
war in the days and weeks following 9/11 became gradually less effective and more
controversial,  “the  production  and  circulation  of  ‘positive’  representations  of  the
‘enemy’ has become essential to projecting the United States as benevolent, especially
in its declaration of war and passage of racist policies” (7). This policy was to promote
the delusion of entering a multicultural and postrace era, but in reality, it declared the
formation of “a new postrace racism” (Alsultany 7).  Thus, a new critical analysis of
sympathetically portrayed Arabs and Muslims in the context of their narratives will
reveal these ideological messages in relation to the larger discourse of the “War on
Terror”  and  also  point  out  how  these  portrayals  contribute  to  the  illusion  of  a
multicultural post-race era.
12 On another front, one needs to bear in mind that Islamophobia is not solely propagated
by the right-wing press and politicians. Khaled Beydoun reminds us that “[c]ontrary to
popular  caricatures  and  flat  media  portrayals,  Islamophobes  are  not  always
conservatives, far-right zealots, ‘lone wolf’ killers, presidential hopefuls—or presidents
—using hateful rhetoric,  evangelical  ideologues,  or Trump voters” (30).  In the same
vein, Hamid Dabashi writes in “The Liberal Roots of Islamophobia” (2017) that liberal
Islamophobes like Bill Maher, who in HBO’s “Real Time with Bill Maher” referred to the
Qur’an as “Islam’s hate-filled holy book,” “are finagling their hatred of Muslims with
smiling faces, silly jokes, phony arguments, forced laughter and manufactured consent
—with  the  full  cooperation  of  otherwise  perfectly  respectable  outlets.”  Dabashi
contends that  “Islamophilia  is  as  deranged as  Islamophobia,”  and that  these critics
“dare to talk about the ‘battle of ideas’ without a single citation of any living or dead
Muslim theologian, philosopher, mystic, poet, artist, or public intellectual evident in
their vertiginously vacuous prose” (Dabashi).
13 Deepa  Kumar  in  Islamophobia:  The  Cultural  Logic  of  Empire reasons  that  although
neoconservatives  and  the  realist/liberal  camps  constitute  two  different  modes  of
thought in policy circles with divergent rhetoric and strategies, “they share a common
commitment to U.S. imperialism. Their points of contention revolve around the best
ways  to  maintain  U.S. dominance  and  global  hegemony”  (5).  She  contends  that
immediately after 9/11, neo-conservative and liberal Islamophobes came together to
converge domestic and foreign policy to wage the “War on Terror.” Kumar maintains
that this resulted in “the construction of the overarching ‘Islamic terrorist’ enemy that
must be fought abroad and at home. The corresponding ‘green scare’ (green is the color
of Islam) is similar to the various anticommunist ‘red scares’ that marked US domestic
politics in the twentieth century” (5). Therefore, detecting the latent Islamophobia of
liberals  and  leftists  or  the  implied  Islamophobic  messages  conveyed  along  with
sympathetic portrayals of Arabs and Muslims in Hollywood films and TV shows in the
prolonged “War on Terror” era is a task that must be taken on. 
14 Hollywood’s new representational strategies, with regard to Islam and the Middle East,
as  Alsultany  contends,  include  “Inserting  Patriotic  Arab  or  Muslim  Americans,”
“Sympathizing with the Plight of Arab and Muslim,” “Challenging the Arab/Muslim
Conflation with Diverse Muslim Identities,”  “Flipping the Enemy,” “Humanizing the
Terrorist,”  “Projecting  a  Multicultural  U.S.  Society,” and “Fictionalizing  the  Middle
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Eastern or Muslim Country” (21-26). These strategies assist the producers to exonerate
themselves from charges such as Islamophobia and Orientalism in the so-called post-
race era,3 while simultaneously allowing them to produce films and shows that cater to
the public’s Islamophobic and Orientalist impulses.
15 I chose to study Homeland and Syriana for two reasons. On the one hand, the figure of
the suicide terrorist is represented in both. On the other hand, they both attempt to
complicate  and  challenge  former  stereotypical  portrayals  of  Middle  Easterners  and
Muslims.  The  writers  of  Homeland and  Syriana have  tried  to  shift  away  from
Islamophobia  and negative  stereotyping  of  Muslims  and Arabs.  They  position  their
viewers to either largely sympathize with the plight of Muslims or show antipathies
towards the U.S. imperialist politics in the Middle East, ultimately presenting viewers
with  some  explanations  for  George  W.  Bush’s  enquiry  of  “Why  do  they  hate  us?”
However,  the Islamophobic  messages  of  Samuel  P.  Huntington’s  Clash  of  Civilizations
(1996) between the West and Islam in the form of a war between CIA agents or U.S.
marines and Islamic extremists is still at play. Therefore, despite avoiding a monolithic
picture  of  Islam,  Arab  and  Muslim  identities  are  still  understood  and  evaluated
primarily in relation to terrorism and sometimes as suicide assailants. Either they are—
to use Mahmood Mamdani’s concept—Good Muslims in alliance with the U.S. in fighting
the “War on Terror” or they are Bad Muslims who plot a terror attack against the West.
 
4. Homeland
16 The  first  two  seasons  of  the  Showtime  series  Homeland,  which  was  renewed  for  a
seventh season in 2019, revolves around sergeant Nicholas Brody (Damian Lewis), an
American marine veteran who had been captured by Al-Qaeda in Iraq and spent eight
years of his life in Abu-Nazir’s (Navid Negahban) custody. After a long term of torture,
humiliation and darkness, he was assigned to teach English to Nazir’s son Issa (Rohan
Chand) in return for more comfort. Nazir’s son is killed along with eighty-one other
schoolchildren  in  a  drone  attack  which  was  planned  by  the  American  army  to
assassinate Abu-Nazir. The Vice President (Jamey Sheridan) authorized bombing the
school  next  to  Nazir’s  house,  even  though  he  knew  that  this  attack  would  affect
schoolchildren. Later, in a press conference, he negates the whole incident and calls it
media propaganda. Under the influence of Abu-Nazir, Brody converts to Islam, becomes
Nazir’s disciple and swears to avenge Issa’s death. During an American forces operation
in Iraq, Brody is freed from an Al-Qaeda jail and returned to the U.S. as a war hero. After
passing a difficult period of readjustment to his family and old life, Brody receives the
mission and necessary equipment to execute a suicide attack against the Vice President
of  the  United  States,  who  is  going  to  announce  his  candidacy  for  the  presidency.
However, a phone call from his daughter at the last second stops him from detonating
his bomb vest. 
17 Aside from Brody and his family, the other two main characters of Homeland,  Carrie
Mathison (Claire Danes) and Saul Berenson (Mandy Patinkin), are also white Americans.
The main antagonist in the narrative is an Al-Qaeda leader from Iraq. Although this
setting  appears  to  tell  another  American  classic  good-versus-evil  story  with  all  its
potentials  for  misrepresentation  of  the  Muslim  evil,  the  narrative  complicates
portrayals of Muslims and terrorists and avoids the usual stereotypical imagery. Carrie
and Saul are two CIA agents whose heroic acts always neutralize terrorist plots and
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save American lives. The CIA director, David Estes (David Harewood), is played by an
African  American  and  his  role  is  designed  to  project  the  multiculturalism  and
meritocracy  of  American  society.  Although  David’s character  fulfills  the  diversity
agenda  of  “neoliberal  multiculturalism,”  his  mishandling  of  critical  situations
perpetuates the viewers’ belief that perhaps saviors ought to be white Americans. The
audience could also “sympathize with the plight of Arabs and Muslims” (Asultany 22)
through witnessing the innocent killing of Issa along with the other schoolchildren by a
CIA-sanctioned  drone  strike.  At  the  same  time,  Abu-Nazir  is  not  portrayed  as  an
absolute  devil,  rather  as  a  charismatic  intelligent  leader.  He  is  also  “humanized”
(Alsultany 24) as a loving father who is not plotting the terror attack against American
civilians purely because of his Islamist cause, but because he wants to take revenge on
the responsible person for his son’s killing. 
18 Abu-Nazir  could easily  have the Vice  President  assassinated by his  other  American
disciple, Tom Walker (Chris Chalk), who was captured and converted to Islam in Iraq
along with Brody. Yet, he plots a suicide attack on American soil and convinces Brody
to  implement  this  mission.  A  suicide  terror  attack  by  a  white  American  would
demonstrate the power of an Islamic ideology that can capture the soul and body of an
American war hero and inspire him to sacrifice his life in order to coerce the American
military to withdraw from occupied territories in the Middle East.  As a part of  the
tradition  of  the  suicide  bombers,  Sergeant  Brody  tapes  a  statement  before  the
operation, where he explains the motivation for his action:
I love my country, what I am is a marine like my father before me and his father
before him. And as a marine, I swore an oath to defend the United States of America
against  enemies  both  foreign  and  domestic.  My  action  this  day  is  against  such
domestic enemies—the vice president and members of his national security team,
who I know to be liars and war criminals, responsible for atrocities they were never
held accountable for. This is about justice for eighty-two children, whose deaths
were never acknowledged and whose murder is a stain on the soul of this nation.
19 However, it is against the politics of the American media industry to portray a white
American (even one that converted to Islam) as a terrorist, let alone a suicide bomber.
The story is not told because terrorists always originate in the Orient and “the land of
the free” is by definition destined to cultivate freedom and democracy, not to breed
terrorism. According to American mainstream media, only Arab Muslims or Muslims
from the Middle East can give up all worldly ties and sacrifice their lives in order to kill
the enemy who is threatening their community. 
20 Brody, who had once disappointed Abu-Nazir, proves his loyalty to him by killing Tom
Walker.  He progresses to be elected to the United States  House of  Representatives.
Nonetheless,  Brody’s  alliance  with  Abu-Nazir  continues  in  the  second  season  of
Homeland. While Carrie and Saul are leading an operation to assassinate Abu-Nazir in
Beirut, Brody saves Nazir’s life at the last minute by warning him about the operation.
Among the documents that Carrie collects from the field in Beirut, Saul finds Brody’s
taped testimony to his unfulfilled suicide attack. Under interrogation Brody confesses
to his cooperation with Abu-Nazir and pledges to work as a double agent for the CIA to
deter terror attacks on America. At the end of the second season, a car-bombing hits
the  CIA  headquarters  leaving  several  casualties  including  David,  the  CIA  director.
Because Brody’s car has been used for the explosion, the evidence seems to confirm
that Brody had conducted the terror attack. However, Carrie, who suffers from bipolar
disorder and is genuinely dedicated to protecting U.S. national security, represents the
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Manichean spirit of the discourse of the “War on Terror”:4 she believes that Brody is
innocent and helps him to flee to Canada. Brody comes back in the third season of the
show to prove his patriotism by penetrating the Iranian Intelligent Service inside Iran.
After  his  arrest  in  Iran,  he  is  hanged  by  the  Iranian  Revolutionary  Guard  in  a
dramatically  depicted  Iranophobic  scene.  Brody’s  public  execution  in  a  residential
neighborhood  in  Tehran  before  the  Iranian  public  (including  children)  who  are
chanting “Death to America” and “Allah-o Akbar,” links Islamophobia and Iranophobia
conveniently at a time when a conflation of Middle Easterners, anti-American Muslims,
and terrorism was needed more than ever. It was a time when U.S. propaganda was
aimed at  orchestrating  an international  coalition against  Iran and its  controversial
nuclear program. This narrative introduced the Islamic Republic of Iran, equipped with
nuclear weapons, as a larger threat to global peace and regional stability than Al-Qaeda
and Saddam ever could be. 
21 Homeland represents  the  anti-American  threat  of  Islamist  terrorism  as  an  ever-
increasing menace within the U.S. borders and against the U.S. forces and allies in the
Middle East. The Islamist terrorists are represented as cunning enemies of the West,
but Carrie and Saul will always overcome the challenges of neutralizing their plots.
 
5. Syriana
22 Syriana,5 directed by Stephen Gaghan and released in 2005 (two years after the U.S.
military  invasion  of  Iraq)  offers  an  overview  of  U.S.  imperialist  geopolitics  in  the
Middle  East  and  its  consequences  for  the  marginalized  Muslim  individuals  and
communities in the region. With sympathetic portrayals of Arab Muslims and other
Muslims such as Pakistanis, the film holds global capitalism and American imperialism
accountable for the plight of some groups of Muslim migrant laborers in the oil states
of the Persian Gulf. 
23 Wasim and his father, Saleem Ahmed Khan (Mazhar Munir and Shahid Ahmed), two
Pakistani migrant workers at a Connex refinery, are being laid off due to a Chinese
company  outbidding  Connex  for  the  rights  to  run  that  facility.  Unemployed  and
threatened by deportation and poverty, Wasim desperately and unsuccessfully searches
for work. Wasim and his friend join an Islamic school to learn Arabic to improve their
employment  prospects.  Then they meet  a  charismatic  Islamic  fundamentalist  cleric
who earlier had stolen an anti-tank missile  from a CIA agent.  The teachings of the
radical teacher of the Madressa triggers Wasim’s personal incentive to take revenge on
the cause of his plight. A radical interpretation of his religious faith equips him with an
ideology to conduct an act of suicide terrorism. Eventually, divested of their political
status, the two Pakistani workers take refuge in an extremist ideology to sacrifice their
“bare lives” in a suicide attack by riding their weaponized vessel into on a Connex-
Killen LNG tanker. Wasim represents the people of the extremely poor regions of the
global  south  as  being  the  most  vulnerable  to  extremist  ideologies.  These  suicidal
assailants with their stateless bodies symbolize that if “capitalism cannot exist without
waste [i.e. the victims of global capitalism],” as one economic advisor in the film tells
us, these victims, who had been reduced to a state of living dead, will come back and
combat the capitalist system. Global neoliberalism degrades Wasim from an individual
citizen  of  the  world  into  a  stateless,  “homeless”  non-citizen  worker  of  global
capitalism. In Agamben’s terminology Wasim had been transformed from “Bio” into
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“Zoe” (see Agamben 1998),  without any political  rights.  Wasim is  the last  part  of  a
network  of arms  trafficking  and  proxy  wars  in  the  Middle  East  including  Iranian
intelligence  agents,  Hezbollah,  CIA  and  Islamic  clerics  both  in  Lebanon  and  in  the
religious schools. Captured by Islamist ideology, Wasim and his friend arm their bare
bodies6 with a missile that was very likely produced by the American weapons industry
to conduct a suicide attack on one of the economic arms of the American war machine.
According to Achille Mbembe,
A war machine combines a plurality of functions. It has the features of a political
organization  and  a  mercantile  company.  It  operates  through  capture  and
depredations and can even coin its own money. In order to fuel the extraction and
export  of  natural  resources  located in the territory they control,  war machines
forge direct connections with transnational networks. (32)
24 Syriana’s narrative exposes the U.S. war machine and its rationale very critically. In a
parallel plot, the CIA assassinates Prince Nasir (Alexander Siddig), who in contrast to
his  father’s  repressive  government  and  conformism  to  American  interests,  is  a
progressive politician dedicated to a nationalist agenda. Prince Nasir is going to foster
long-term  sustainable  development  by  introducing  democratic  reforms  and
diversifying the economy of his country in preparation for the time when the oil runs
out. As the emirate’s foreign minister, Prince Nasir grants natural gas drilling rights to
a Chinese company, which greatly upsets the U.S. oil industry and the U.S. government.
Thus, the American government urges the King to name his younger son Meshal (Akbar
Kurtha) as his successor, causing Nasir to attempt a coup. On his way to assume power
as the new king with a convoy of his supporters, the CIA strikes the automobile of Nasir
and  his  family  with  a  guided  bomb  from  a  circling  predator  drone,  killing  them
instantly. The fact that the U.S. feels free to assassinate foreign leaders on their own
soil is evidence of its imperialist necropolitics which I would term as the “neocolonial
transnational right to kill.” 
6. Suicide Terrorism in the New Discourse on
Terrorism
25 Scrutinizing the history of suicide terrorism and representations of this phenomenon
in  the  new discourse  on  terrorism will  help  us  to  better  understand  why  the  two
characters who were on suicide missions, Brody in Homeland and Wasim in Syriana, act
differently in the end. How can we make logical sense of the representations of suicide
terrorism in the narratives of Homeland and Syriana, where a white American does not
fulfill  his  suicide  terrorist  mission,  but  a  young  Muslim  man  from  Pakistan
accomplishes his assigned task?
26 In the post-Cold War era and the post-9/11 era of the “War on Terror,” Islam has come
to represent the horror of terrorism and suicide terrorism and this has subsequently
been specialized for Muslims. However, studies on the history of suicide terrorism can
disrupt the equivalence of Islam and terrorism by bringing into light the existence of
Jewish terrorists in 66 AD, Christian terrorism, and Shi’a Islamic terrorism of Islamili
Assassins. In Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (2006), Robert A. Pape
shows that religion is “rarely the root cause of terrorism [but] often used as a tool in
recruiting and in other efforts in service of the broader strategic objective” (4). Pape
defines  terrorism as  “the use  of  violence by an organization other  than a  national
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government to intimidate or frighten a target audience.… In general, terrorism has two
broad purposes: to gain supporters and to coerce opponents” (9). According to him, the
most  important  forms  of  terrorism  include  “demonstrative,”  “destructive,”  and
“suicide” terrorism. Pape writes:
‘Demonstrative terrorism’ is  as  much political  theater as  violence.  It  is  directed
mainly at gaining publicity, for any or all of three reasons: to recruit more activists;
to  gain  attention  to  grievances  from  soft-liners  on  the  other  side;  and  to  gain
attention from third parties who might exert pressure on the other side. (9) 
27 “Destructive  terrorism,”  on  the  contrary,  “is  more  aggressive,  seeking  to  coerce
opponents with the threat of injury or death as well as to mobilize support for the
cause”  (Pape  10).  The  most  aggressive  form  of  terrorism  is,  however,  “suicide
terrorism.”  According  to  Pape,  “[w]hat  distinguishes  a  suicide  terrorist  is  that  the
attacker does not expect to survive the mission and often employs a method of attack
(such as a car bomb, suicide vest, or ramming an airplane into a building) that requires
his or her death in order to succeed” (10). Nearly all suicide terrorists pursue a secular
and strategic  goal  of  either coercing the occupying powers to withdraw from their
homeland  or  compelling  a  target  government  to  change  policy.  According  to  Pape
“suicide terrorism attempts to inflict pain on the opposing society to overwhelm its
interest  in  resisting  the  terrorists’  demands,  and  so  to  induce  the  government  to
concede, or the population to revolt against the government” (27-8). Because militarily
they are in a weaker position in the power structure, they sacrifice their own lives to
cause  the  colonizer  or  its  agents  damage  in  the  most  efficient  manner.  Velupillai
Prabhakaran, the leader of the communist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or
the Tamil Tigers) in Sri Lanka, in a major speech in 1998 said:
In terms of manpower,  firepower and resources,  the enemy was strong and the
balance of military power was in his favor. Yet we had an extraordinary weapon
which was not in the arsenal of the enemy. The courage and commitment of our
fighters was our most powerful weapon in the battle.… The Black Tigers [suicide
squad] are the self-protective armor of our race. They are the men of flame who can
destroy the enemy’s armed strength. (in Pape 33)
28 Alex Houen in “Sacrificial Militancy and the Wars around Terror” reminds us that “the
first  suicide  bombings  in  the  early  twentieth  century  were  carried  out  by  secular
Russian anarchists, and the next major instance was that of Japanese ‘kamikaze’ pilots
in World War II” (114). Although no religion inherently promotes and justifies terrorist
acts or suicide terrorism, under certain circumstances religion can be instrumentalized
by political actors and religious leaders involved in games of coercion to “institute an
idealism  of  transcendent  justifications  for  a  community”  (Houen  115).  These
transcendent  values  could  be  “democracy,”  “freedom,”  or  “God,”  and  “the  nation”
(Houen 114).
29 Yet,  in the contemporary era,  except for the communist  Liberation Tigers of  Tamil
Eelam in Sri Lanka, most suicide attacks around the world have been perpetrated by
radical Islamist organizations such as Hamas in Lebanon, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, Al-
Qaeda and finally ISIS (see Pape passim).  The Islamic background of the majority of
twenty-first-century terrorists,  the religious rhetoric of the mobilizing forces of the
terrorist  activities  stated in  the  sermons of  some radical  Islamists  and reflected in
instructions for terrorist operations, can provide convincing evidence for Islamophobes
who identify Islam with terrorism. 
Islamophobia without Islamophobes: New Strategies of Representing Imperialist...
European journal of American studies, 15-3 | 2020
10
30 For instance, Al-Qaeda’s infamous fatwa against the United States, signed by Osama bin
Laden and others reads:
The  ruling  to  kill  the  Americans  and  their  allies—civilians  and  military—is  an
individual  duty  for  every  Muslim  who  can  do  it  in  any  country  in  which  it  is
possible  to  do it,  in  order to  liberate  the al-Aksa Mosque and the holy mosque
[Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of
Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. (in Pape 32)
31 The text of the operative instructions and spiritual guidelines for the terrorists who
committed the attacks of September 11, 2001 reads:
Read  the  Al-Tawbah  [i.e.,  Repentance],  the  Anfal  chapters  [in  the  Qur’an],  and
reflect on their meaning and what Allah has prepared for the believers and the
martyrs in paradise.… Be cheerful for you have only moments between you and
your eternity, after which a happy and satisfying life begins, the eternal pleasures
with the prophets, the righteous, the good and the martyrs, … Allah is our best
Representative and Defender. ‘That devil scares his followers’ who admire Western
civilization and swallow their love and beatification of it with cold water… ‘God will
frustrate conspiracies of the infidels.’ Do not take revenge for yourself, but make
your strikes and everything in the name of Allah.… When the time of truth and the
Zero Hour arrives,  then rip open your clothes,  and bare your chest  to embrace
death for the sake of Allah! [. . .] ‘Do not consider those who were killed for the sake
of  Allah  dead,’  …  and  your  last  words  should  be:  .There  is  no  god  but  Allah.
Mohammed is His messenger!’ (“The Last Night Letter”)
32 Three identical copies of this manifesto hand-written in Arabic were recovered from
the hijackers’  belongings in Boston,  Washington DC and at  the crash site of  United
Airlines  Flight  93  in  Western  Pennsylvania.  The  FBI  released  this  evidence  on
September 28, 2001 and named it “The Last Night Letter.” It has been also known as
“Manual for a Raid.”7 Multiple references in this document to some selected passages
from the Qur’an and the history of Islam to justify martyrdom and mass murder of
enemies of Islam have be utilized by conservatives to prove the accuracy of the ‘clash of
civilizations’ theory and to legitimize rising Islamophobic sentiments. 
33 Nevertheless,  Mbembe’s  notions  of  necropower  and  necropolitics  explain  suicide
terrorism as expressions of agency and sovereignty over life, i.e., death and afterlife for
the colonized subject who has been already stripped to his/her bones of his/her agency
by the colonizers. In this way, the religiously stimulated “martyr-to-be” sacrifices his/
her own life and body for two higher ends. On the one hand, martyrdom “paves the
way to a  happy life” which “[he/she]  believes,  rests  only in God himself.  And only
through conversion can an authentic relationship to God arise” (Mbembe 50). On the
other hand, the suicide terrorist’s commitment to martyrdom struggles to coerce the
occupying  powers  and  colonizers  to  withdraw  from  their  homeland,  which  will
hypothetically  facilitate  the happiness of  his/her people.  Thus,  the language of  the
instructions for the suicide terrorists of the September 11 and other manuals can be
explained as formulation of a religious necropolitics.
34 Mbembe draws on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger and George Bataille about death
to elucidate the relation between terror, sacrifice and freedom. Mbembe writes that
Heidegger’s granting an existential status to the human “being toward death” as the
“the decisive condition of all true human freedom” (Heidegger 74) means “one is free
to live one’s own life only because one is free to die one’s own death” (Mbembe 90).
35 Georges Bataille in an essay on “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice” writes, “in order for man to
reveal himself ultimately to himself, he would have to die, but he would have to do it
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while living—watching himself ceasing to be. In other words, death itself would have to
become self-consciousness of itself” (19). Thus, “the human subject has to be fully alive
at the very moment of dying, to be aware of his own death, to live with the impression
of actually dying” (Mbembe 90). In this sense, sacrifice achieves the condition of self-
awareness of death at the very moment of ceasing to exist. The sacrificed “dies seeing
himself die, and even, in some sense, through his own will, at one with the weapon of
sacrifice” (Mbembe 90). In the case of suicide bombers,
the sacrifice consists of the spectacular putting to death of the self, of becoming his
or her own victim (self-sacrifice). The self-sacrificed proceeds to take power over
his or her death and to approach it head on. This power may be derived from the
belief that the destruction of one’s own body does not affect the continuity of the
being. The idea is that the being exists outside of us.  The self-sacrifice consists,
here, in the removal of a twofold prohibition: that of self-immolation (suicide) and
that of murder. (Mbembe 38)
36 Martyrdom embodies “being-towards-death.” It can be a religious act, as in the case of
Jihadi  suicide  bombers,  or  motivated  by  secular  imperatives,  as  with  the  freedom
fighters  in  the  colony  or  the  soldiers  of  the  colonizing  powers  who  are  called
rhetorically to sacrifice their lives for the higher values of the nation such as freedom
and democracy,8 but practically for the interest of the Empire. The martyrs continue to
live because if their deaths were religiously inspired, religion had equipped them with
afterlife philosophy. If their deaths had secular motivations such as independence and
liberty for the colonized “freedom fighters” or protecting freedom and democracy for
the fighters of the “War on Terror,” the martyrs continue to thrive through their ideals
and historical deeds.
37 The  new  discourse  on  terrorism,  descending  from  Orientalism,  essentializes  this
religious necropolitics as inherently Islamic to serve the interests of Empire and justify
the suspension of the rule of law in occupied territories such as Iraq and Afghanistan.
As Edward Said writes in “The Essential Terrorist,” an article published in Blaming the
Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question (1988), “the spurious excuse of
‘fighting  terrorism’  serves  to  legitimize  every  case  of  torture,  illegal  detention,
demolition  of  houses,  expropriation  of  land,  murder,  collective  punishment,
deportation, censorship, closure of schools and universities” (Said 156). 
38 In another essay entitled “Punishment by Detail” (2002), Said criticized the distorted
image of the reality of Palestinian people through the misrepresentation of Palestinian
suicide bombings. While admitting the unforgivable horror of terrorism, he points out
that:  “Suicide  bombing  is  reprehensible  but  it  is  a  direct  and,  in  my  opinion,  a
consciously programmed result of years of abuse, powerlessness, and despair. It has as
little to do with the Arab or Muslim supposed propensity for violence as the man in the
moon.” Stephen Morton explains that Said criticizes the discourse of terrorism because
it “is used by the United States and its allies to describe violent acts of resistance to
imperial occupation rather than addressing the violence of imperial occupation itself”
(36). Morton argues that the causal logic of the discourse on terrorism “conceals the
fact  that  the  threat  of  terrorism is  an  instance  of  metalepsis:  an  effect of  colonial
discourse that is presented as a cause”9 (36). This logic, according to him, focuses “on
the emotional and aesthetic connotation of terror instead of examining the geopolitical
context of its production” (Morton 37). Similarly, Malreddy (2015) writes that the term
“terrorism” “has come to represent a nameless Oriental collective that stretches from
the Saharan Tuareg in North Africa to the Solomon Islands in the Asia Pacific. Thus, …
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the Oriental collective that is glutted by seamlessly borderless terrorists can no longer
be defined in terms of a fixed geographical entity” (3). Indeed, the new discourse on
terrorism designates terror to alien domains and outlines the borders of the Orient
according to the terrorists’ origins. In other words, Orientalism defined the Orient as
geography of Otherness which is characterized by Islamic fundamentalism, women’s
repression and tyrant rulers. The Orient for the new discourse on terrorism constitutes
an imaginary geography from which the terrorists come. “Terrorism” defines where
the Orient is, because “[t]error and torture always refer to the actions of others, never
to  ourselves  [meaning  Americans]”  (Gregory  229).  Moreover,  the  United  States  of
America is by definition incapable of breeding terrorists and/or equipping them with
the required ideological weapons. Even in case of Muslim American citizens involved in
terrorist attacks in the U.S., their country of origin outside of U.S. borders, somewhere
in the Orient, will be pronounced as their homeland because “home-grown terrorism”
in the West is unimaginable. Therefore, a terrorist is always already “foreign-grown”
(Malreddy 4). As a result, even in the cases of Timothy McVeigh10 and Andres Behring
Breivik11,  the term “home-grown terrorist” has been hardly used. Malreddy reports,
“four years after the tragedy, Breivik is certified as a ‘maverick,’ a ‘nut-ball,’ a ‘crazy-
loner’—but not quite a terrorist” (4).
39 Malreddy writes that “unlike ‘old’ terrorism, which is defined as a violent but unlawful
form  of  political  resistance,  ‘new’  or  ‘categorical  terrorism’  refers  to  the
nonconventional,  nonpolitical,  and even ‘irrational’12 violence that primarily targets
Western civilians” (Goodwin in Malreddy 4). Thus, in the new discourse on terrorism
[i]f a Westerner kills his fellow civilians, he is a ‘crazy-loner;’ if an Oriental kills his
fellow civilians, he is the good old terrorist; and if the same Oriental kills Western
civilians,  he  is  the  ‘new’  terrorist.  Only Western  ways  of  killing  civilians—be it
through  war,  invasion,  or  military  conquest  [which  Mbembe  explains,  are  not
‘subject  to  legal  and  institutional  rules’  (Mbembe  78)]—are  deemed  superior,
proper, and unquestionably legitimate. (Porter in Malreddy 4)
40 Therefore, according to the logic of the new discourse on terrorism, Sergeant Brody
could not be portrayed as a suicide bomber because this role is reserved for Muslim
Middle Easterners such as Wasim.
 
7. Conclusion
41 As  Achille  Mbembe  (2003)  reminds  us,  an  important  feature  of  the  wars  of  the
globalization era is that “military operations and the exercise of the right to kill are no
longer the sole monopoly of  states,  and the ‘regular army’ is  no longer the unique
modality of carrying out these functions” (31). The growing gap between high-tech and
low-tech means of war in addition to the illegitimate imperialist presence of the West
has given rise to the necropower of the figure of the ‘suicide terrorist’ who uses his/her
own body as a means to confront the state’s necropower. Therefore, from a broader
view, the “War on Terror” and terrorist suicide attacks represent an ongoing contest
between the U.S.-led Western states and non-state militant Islamist organizations over
the “right to kill” the Other who is either, for Americans, a threat to national security
and democracy or, for Al-Qaeda followers and ISIS fighters, a threat to their Islamist
ideology and the cause of the plight of destitute Muslims and Arabs in the Middle East.
After all,  G.W. Bush’s “War on Terror” agenda was based on his assumed sovereign
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right  to  kill  the  adversaries  of  what  his  administration  framed  as  modern  liberal
democracy. 
42 On  another  level,  the  Muslim  people  of  the  Middle  East  are  subject  to  both  U.S.
neocolonial necropolitics and imperialist biopolitics. These people, who are full citizens
in their countries of origin during and after the state of exception, will either be killed
in  the  middle  of  the  bloody  competition  between  the  U.S.  necropolitics  and  the
necropolitics of violent non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda, Taliban and ISIS or flee their
lands in order to survive. As a result, displacement divests these war refugees, who are
often educated and skilled workers  in  their  homelands,  of  their  human rights  to  a
happy and safe life and alters them from full citizens of their countries to stateless
asylum seekers and eventually to second-class cheap labor force for Western countries.
In this way, Empire exports products of its arms industry to the flourishing markets of
the  war  zones  and  imports  cheap  labor.  This  simultaneity  of  biopolitics  and
necropolitics  is  the  unique  characteristic  of  a  neocolonial  imperialist  power  in  the
twenty-first century, which under the state of exception assumes the right to kill, to
allow to live, or to expose to death, which eventually manipulates the natural flow of
the world populations in many directions and many respects.
43 The  American  neo-colonial  necropolitics  could  not  be  executed  in  the  Middle  East
without an Islamophobic construction of an “Arab-Middle-Eastern-Muslim Other.” In
Islamophobia and Racism in America (2017), Erik Love explains that the racialization of
Muslim identity in the “War on Terror” prescribed Muslim Americans and nationals of
Muslim majority countries a collective political identity which would translate into the
suspicion  of  terrorism  and  subversion.  Islamophobia,  according  to  Semati,  “posits
‘Islam’  as  a  conception  of  the  world  that  is  incompatible  with  modernity,  with
civilization, and, more important, with Euro-Americanness. Islamophobia, on the one
hand, creates difference (the ‘Other’) and, on the other hand, erases difference (all of
‘them’  are  the  ‘same’)”  (267).  Therefore,  American  imperialism  instrumentalizes
modernity and its values such as freedom, human rights, democracy, women’s rights
and equality to racialize Islam, otherize Muslims, and implement politics which target
those states and non-governmental organizations who endanger its capitalist interests. 
44 Because modern racism based on biological differences has been long discredited and
disgraced,  Islamophobia,  as  “an essentialist  view of  peoples whose culture it  deems
‘different’ in an eternal, fixed, and immutable fashion” (Semati 266), is built on cultural
differences. Semati points out that “[i]n the ‘neo-racist’ logic, the Other/self dichotomy
is no longer explained in an inferior/superior framework. Instead, the Other is believed
to  be  ‘different’”  (266).  In  the  era  of  neo-liberal  multiculturalism  which  largely
translates into “racism without races,” “cultural racism” (Balibar, Naber) substitutes
race  and “racial  difference”  with culture  and “cultural  difference.”  It  also  replaces
insults  against  Muslims  such  as  “sand  nigger”  and  “diaperhead”  with  respectful
sentences such as “they are different” and “we cannot mingle because our life-styles
and  traditions  are  incompatible.”  Aside  from  the  “cultural  racism”  of  private
Islamophobes,  according  to  Nadine  Naber  in  “Look,  Mohammed  the  Terrorist  Is
Coming!” the period of post-9/11 has witnessed a “nation-based racism” of structural
Islamophobia as well. According to Naber, “[i]n the context of the ‘War on Terror,’ the
interplay  between  culture-based  racism  and  nation-based  racism  has  articulated
subjects perceived to be ‘Arab/Middle Eastern/Muslim’ not only as a moral, cultural,
and civilizational threat to the ‘American’ nation, but also as a security threat” (280).
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Beydoun (2018) shows that structural Islamophobia reflects and authorizes the private
Islamophobia of ordinary people on the one hand, while it is supported, voted for and
reelected by private Islamophobes and reproduced and reinstated by the media, art and
literature, on the other hand. 
45 As Alsultany contends, “government and media discourses” on the “War on Terror” are
inextricably interrelated and together form a “hegemonic field of meaning” premised
on “they hate us for our freedom” (Arabs and Muslims 7). This discourse “provided the
logic and justification needed to pass racist foreign and domestic policies and provided
the suspicion needed for many citizens to tolerate the targeting of Arabs and Muslims,
often without any evidence that they were involved in terrorist activities” (Alsultany
7).  Alsultany,  in  response  to a  conservative  film  critic  who  was  concerned  that
humanizing the terrorists in films such as Syriana blurred the moral difference between
terrorist and those who fight terrorism and raised sympathy for the terrorists, points
out that “viewer responses suggest that for most the dominant message remains the
same: the United States is at war against terrorism because Arabs and Muslims are a
threat”  (38).  She  views  the  impact  of  these  “simplified  complex  representational
strategies” (14) to being limited to circumventing accusations of racism for the writers
and  producers  with  the  aim  of  maintaining  the  largest  viewership  possible.  These
viewers generally “take away the message that Arabs and Muslims are a threat to U.S.
national security despite a few Arab and Muslim characters that are against terrorism”
(Alsultany 38).
46 What Hollywood films and American TV shows have failed to convey to their viewers is
that there are some millions of Muslims who are living peacefully in the U.S. just like
other  citizens  and  work  as  doctors,  engineers,  university  professors,  taxi  drivers,
construction workers, etc. whose stories and characters, regardless of their religious
views,  could  be  told  and  depicted  in  American  films  and  TV  shows,  and  not  just
relegated to stories related to terrorism and war in the Middle East.
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1. Islamophobia without Islamophobes in the title of my essay is inspired by Eduardo
Bonilla-Silva’s  Racism  Without  Racists:  Color-blind  Racism  and  the  Persistence  of  Racial
Inequality in the United States.
2. “Failing to account for the law’s role in authorizing and executing Islamophobia overlooks the
relationship state actors have to the hateful  violence of  individual  bigots,  and it  ignores the
reality that the state enlists private citizens to partake in the national project of identifying and
punishing individuals stereotyped as presumptive terrorists” (Beydoun 19).
3. See also Saldívar, Ramón. “Historical Fantasy, Speculative Realism, and Postrace Aesthetics in
Contemporary American Fiction.” American Literary History, vol. 23, no. 3, 2011, pp. 574-599.
4. I am referring to G.W. Bush’s dividing the world into ‘with us’ or ‘with the terrorist.’
5. I read the film’s title, Syriana as a combination of Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia. “In a December
2005 interview, Baer told NPR that the title is a metaphor for foreign intervention in the Middle
East, referring to post-World War II think tank strategic studies for the creation of an artificial
state (such as Iraq, created from elements of the former Ottoman Empire) that ensured continued
Western access to crude oil. The movie’s website states that “‘Syriana’ is a real term used by
Washington think-tanks to describe a hypothetical reshaping of the Middle East” (Wikipedia).
6. Referring to Giorgio Agamben’s concept of “bare life.”
7. The author of the manifesto is not clear as of today, but it has been written by one of the
terrorists. It was translated into English along with commentaries by Kanan Makiya and Hassan
Mneimneh
8. “President Bush Visits Troops in Iraq,” 13 June 2006; “President’s Radio Address,” 24
May 2008.
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9. Gayatri Spivak discusses this idea of metalepsis in “Deconstructing Historiography”
(341).
10. Timothy  James  McVeigh  was  a  Gulf  War  veteran  who  planned  and  executed  the  1995
Oklahoma City bombing that killed 168 people and left over 680 others injured.
11. Andres Behring Breivik also known as Andrew Berwick is a Norwegian far-right terrorist who
committed the terrorist attacks on 22 July 2011 in Norway that killed 77 people.
12. Furthermore,  such  “irrationality”  of  violence  is  said  to  be  motivated  by  the
terrorists’ perception that civilian populations in the West are “complicit” with their
state policies against them (Malreddy 4). 
ABSTRACTS
This  paper  investigates  the  geopolitical  context  of  the  emergence  of  “suicide  terrorism”  to
propose that terrorism in its various forms has less to do with religious ideologies in general and
with Islamic faith in particular,  and more to do with the colonial and neocolonial politics of
Empire in the colonies, postcolonies and occupied territories by the U.S. army and its allies in the
Middle East in the post-9/11 era. Two representations of the figure of the suicide terrorist will be
analyzed as they are presented in the narratives suggested in the Showtime series Homeland
(2011-) and the film Syriana (2005). I argue that even though the Islamicate world and Muslims in
the  post-9/11  era  have  generally  been  portrayed  in  a  differentiated  fashion,  these  media
productions have had almost the same effects on the public as earlier Orientalist productions.
Although they appear to endorse antiracism and multiculturalism on the surface, these current
narratives simultaneously produce what Evelyn Alsultany calls “the logics and affects necessary
to  legitimize  racist  policies  and  practices”  (Alsultany  162).  A  “dialectical  Islamophobia”
(Beydoun 40) that is at play in the West and Western media productions legitimizes and values
imperialist necropolitics while delegitimizing its opponent, namely the religious necropolitics of
suicide terrorism.
INDEX




Mahmoud Arghavan is an independent scholar from Iran residing in Munich. He completed his
PhD in American Studies at Free University of Berlin in 2013 with a dissertation entitled “Iranian
American Literature: From Collective Memory to Cultural Identity.” Since 2016 he has been
working as coordinator for the Unit of Aid for Refugees, Migration, and Integration at Innere
Mission in Munich. His research interests include Diaspora Studies, Postcolonial Studies, Critical
Islamophobia without Islamophobes: New Strategies of Representing Imperialist...
European journal of American studies, 15-3 | 2020
18
Race Theory, Border Studies, Global Warming and Climate Refugees. He has authored the article
“Postcolonial Orientalism: A Study of the Anti-Imperialist Rhetoric of Middle Eastern
Intellectuals in Diaspora” in the edited collection Postcolonial Justice (Brill, 2017), and co-written
the article “Writing against Neocolonial Necropolitics: Literary Responses by Iraqi/Arab Writers
to the US ‘War on Terror’,” which appeared in a special issue on “Global Responses to the ‘War on
Terror’” in the European Journal of English Studies (2018). He has also co-edited the volume Who Can
Speak and Who Is Heard/Hurt?: Facing Problems of Race, Racism, and Ethnic Diversity in the Humanities in
Germany(transcript April 2019).
Islamophobia without Islamophobes: New Strategies of Representing Imperialist...
European journal of American studies, 15-3 | 2020
19
